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CASE NO. 870236 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS DASKALAS, THE PAWN SHOP & PENTELAKIS 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant tc 
the provisions of §§ 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution; §78-2-2 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (1987 Supp.), and Rule 3 
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellants/Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop and 
Pentelakis will be referred to herein as the "tenants"; the 
Respondents/Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows will be referred 
to herein as the "owners"; and, the Plaintiff/Respondent 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City will be referred to herein 
as the "Plaintiff". "TR" refers to Transcript of Record. "R" 
refers to Record, and "Ex." refers to Exhibit. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in eminent domain involving a tract of 
land situate in Block 57, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Countyf State 
of Utah, generally identified as properties located at 64 and 66 
East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to the commencement of the jury trial in this cause, 
the trial judge ruled, as a matter of law, that the tenants' 
interests and rights in the subject properties had been terminated 
by the filing of the Complaint and that said tenants had no 
compensable interest, except as to the value of any "improvements" 
made by them. In view of the fact that the tenants considered such 
"improvements" to be of minimal value, if any, they did not elect 
to participate in the trial on the issue of damages to prove the 
"bonus value" of their leasehold interests which they contended 
existed on the date of taking. The case then proceeded to trial as 
between the Plaintiff and other designated Defendants. 
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The trial court subsequently made an award of attorney's 
fees in favor of the owners and against the tenants based upon the 
claim or contention that the owners had been required to pursue a 
determination of the rights of the tenants to share in the award. 
It is these rulings which we believe to be erroneous, and as suchf 
constituted prejudicial error and thus give rise to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling, as a 
matter of law, that the filing of the condemnation action by the 
Plaintiff served to terminate the leasehold interests of the 
tenants, and thus deprived the tenants of the right to a full 
evidentiary trial on the issue of damages and just compensation. 
2. Whether any claim for attorney's fees may remain after 
the lease has been terminated and is no longer in effect, and if 
so, whether the award of attorney's fees is reasonable and proper 
under the pleadings and circumstances and adequately supported by 
the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1985, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City filed a Complaint wherein the owners and tenants were 
designated as parties defendant, which action sought to acquire by 
eminent domain all of the right, title, interest, and estate of 
said parties in the premises at 64 and 66 East 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 2-33) On the date of service of Summons and 
issuance of Complaint, June, 1985, the tenants were in possession 
of the said premises pursuant to separate written lease agreements, 
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copies of which are in the Addendum hereto marked as Exhibit "A" 
and Exhibit "B" and by reference are made a part hereof, (R. 
345-362) (TR. 69-73) 
On August 1, 1985f a Motion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy was filed by the Plaintiff seeking the immediate 
occupancy and possession of the total tracts. (R. 38-40) Counsel 
for the tenants executed a Stipulation consenting to the occupancy 
of said premises so far as their interests were concerned. (R. 
71-75) However, the ownersf by and through their counsel, filed an 
Answer to the Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy objecting to 
the granting thereof, raising various issues relative to the need, 
necessity, and right of condemnation. (R. 218-225) Alsof said 
owners filed an Answer to the Complaint challenging the rights of 
the Plaintiff to acquire said property putting at issue the essence 
of the litigation, i.e. could the property in fact be acquired 
through the proceedings instituted by the Plaintiff. (R. 226-229) 
On August 16, 1985, an Order of Immediate Occupancy was 
entered by the Court which was conditional in nature, (R. 231-239), 
and the terms of which were objected to by counsel for the tenants 
for failure to give proper notice. (R. 243-244) In any event, the 
conditions set forth in the Order of Immediate Occupancy failed to 
develop or otherwise occur and the matter proceeded to trial as 
though no Order of Immediate Occupancy had been entered. The 
tenants filed an Answer to the Complaint of the Plaintiff and put 
at issue the questions of just compensation and damages to be 
awarded. (R. 246-250) The objection to the Order of Immediate 
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Occupancy was never resolved nor was any ruling made thereon by 
the trial Court, 
At no time did the owners ever file any cross claim against 
the tenants. On the 25th day of October, 1985, owners filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a ruling from the Court to the 
effect that the tenants were not entitled to share or otherwise 
participate in the award of any damages recovered in said cause. 
(R. 272-284) The tenants resisted said Motion, and the parties 
submitted memoranda of authority in support of their respective 
positions, together with proffered evidence and testimony. 
Subsequent thereto, the trial court refused to make any findings of 
fact but entered Conclusions of Law and Judgment decreeing that the 
tenants had no compensable interest in the property or proceeds of 
the verdict, (R. 532-553), or any award of damages other than what 
may be proven as value of "improvements" made by them, and awarded 
attorney's fees to the owners and against the tenants upon the 
theory that they had incurred such attorney's fees in defending the 
claims of the tenants to share in the compensation and damages 
involved herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The tenants had a vested and subsisting property right in 
the subject premises on the date of "taking" and were entitled to 
present evidence and testimony in support of their claim that their 
respective leasehold interests had a "bonus value", and as such, 
they were entitled to participate in the trial to show the nature 
and extent of damages and right to participate in any award made by 
the jury. 
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Notwithstanding the filing of the Complaint, no absolute 
and final Order of Immediate Occupancy was ever granted prior to 
trial, the owners continued to receive and collect rent from the 
tenants throughout the entire period prior to trial, and no attempt 
was made to give notice or otherwise terminate the leasehold 
interests until counsel for the owners delivered a Notice of 
Termination on the 31st day of January, 1987, 23 days prior to 
trial. (TR. 68-84) (Ex. 8) 
The tenants had a constitutional and statutory compensable 
interest and were entitled to go to trial on that issue, and as 
such, the court committed prejudicial error in denying the tenants 
such rights and no legal or other basis exists for the awarding of 
attorney's fees in favor of the owners and against the tenants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TENANTS POSSESSED SUCH AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
PREMISES AS WOULD HAVE ENTITLED THEM TO GO TO TRIAL ON 
THE ISSUE OF JUST COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES AND 
PRESENT EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY TO SHOW THEY WERE 
ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE AWARD OF ANY SUCH RECOVERY. 
Compensation for property taken or damaged through the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain is mandated pursuant to the 
provisions of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Art. I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, and the manner in 
which such compensation and damages are to be assessed is provided 
under the provisions of 78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
78-34-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides: 
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"All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an 
interest inf any of the property described in the 
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though 
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in respect to 
his own property or interest, or that claimed by him, in 
the same manner as if named in the complaint." 
78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides in 
part as follows: 
"The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence 
as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, 
and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
"(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and 
all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of 
each and every separate estate or interest therein; and if 
it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel 
and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately 
assessed. 
» • * * * * 
• 
« * * * * 
»«* * * * 
"(5) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed 
for each source of damages separately." 
Clearly, under the foregoing constitutional and statutory 
provisions, a tenant in possession of property and claiming an 
interest therein on the date of condemnation is an essential party 
to any such action if the condemning authority is to acquire a 
clear and unencumbered title to the premises by means of the power 
of eminent domain. Whether or not a tenant in possession on the 
date of condemnation possess a compensable interest becomes a 
critical issue to be determined in the process of litigation. 
The tenants in this instance entered into separate written 
leasehold agreements with the owners on the 1st day of August, 
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1981, (Exhibits "A" and "B", Addendum), for an initial leasehold 
period of five years. On the date the Complaint was filed and 
service of process effected, said leases still had approximately 13 
months of unexpired term and were subject to renewal for an 
additional five-year term. Notwithstanding the initiation of the 
eminent domain proceedings, the owners resisted the entry of an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, challenging the authority of the 
condemning agency to acquire the properties in question and refused 
to accept a tender of the statutory deposit without imposition of 
other conditions which were never agreed upon or effectually came 
to pass. Furthermore, the owners continued to treat said leasehold 
interests as being viable, subsisting, and operable leases, 
receiving and collecting the rents on a continuing basis and 
exercising full dominion and control over the premises as lessor 
under the existing lease agreements until the trial which took 
place on February 23-25, 1987. 
Given this background and the fact that the entire matter 
seemed to be in a state of limbo with reference to the ultimate 
condemnation of said property, and no final Order of Immediate 
Occupancy had issued, (see: Statement of Facts in brief filed by 
Plaintiff herein), the tenants, pursuant to the provisions of each 
lease, gave written notice to the owners of their intention to 
renew said lease agreements and having failed to receive any 
response or reply thereto, continued in the possession of said 
premises, continued to make the necessary rental payments which 
were accepted by the owners, and in all respects continued to 
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perform under the terms of the lease agreements as though the same 
had in fact been extended for an additional five-year period. (TR. 
68-84) (Ex. Dl, D2, D3, D4, and D5) Consequently, the tenants 
considered said leases to be valid and subsisting and were prepared 
to go to trial on the issue of damages and just compensation having 
alleged that they were entitled to share in the compensation and 
damages to be awarded. 
It is significant to note that the so called condemnation 
clause contained in each lease agreement (Page 4, Exhibits "A" and 
"B", Addendum) contained the proviso that in the event the property 
is taken or acquired via the power of eminent domain "the lease 
may, at the election of lessor or lessee, be terminated;" (emphasis 
added). The record will disclose that no notice of election or 
other termination was given to either of the tenants until the 31st 
day of January, 1987, shortly before trial. (Ex. 8) Hence it is 
the claim and contention of the tenants that said leasehold rights 
were never terminated, if at all, prior to said date. 
Consequently, the court could not, as a matter of law, conclude 
that the mere filing of the action in eminent domain terminated the 
leasehold interests of the tenants. 
The authorities generally recognize that leasehold 
interests existing on the date of condemnation give rise to a valid 
claim for compensation or damages in the event of a taking or 
damaging of such interest. See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed. 21, where the Court held: 
"Ordinarily, a leasehold interest has a compensable value 
whenever the capitalized then fair rental value for the 
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remaining term of the lease, plus the value of any renewal 
right, exceeds the capitalized value of the rental the 
lease specifies." 
The Court further notes: 
"'The measure of damages is the value of the use and 
occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder of the 
tenant's term, plus the value of the right to renew . . ., 
less the agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such 
use and occupancy.'" (Citing United States v. Petty Motor 
Co., 327 U.S. 381, 66 S.Ct. 601.) 90 L.Ed. 729 
In the case of State of Utah, by and through its Road 
Commission v. Brown, 531 P2d. 1294, the Supreme Court of this State 
held: 
"If the lessee is obligated to pay less than the fair 
market value of the lease, he sustains a loss when his 
interest is taken and the landlord thereby sustains a 
gain." 
Further recognizing the rule as follows: 
"The rule is generally recognized . . . that, where there 
are several interests or estates in a parcel of real estate 
taken by eminent domain, a proper method of fixing the 
value of, or damage to, each interest or estate, is to 
determine the value of, or damage to, the property as a 
whole, and then to apportion the same among the several 
owners according to their respective interests or estates, 
rather than to take each interest or estate as a unit and 
fix the value thereof or damage thereto separately. ..." 
The owners claim that by reason of the condemnation 
provisions of each lease, said lease agreements were terminated and 
ceased to exist as of the date of the condemnation. 
The significant and relevant law on this issue dictates 
that by virtue of the law in this State, the date of "taking" 
occurs as of the date of service of summons and issuance of 
Complaint. See: 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and 
Siegel v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District, 655 P2d 
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662. On the date of "taking", the respective leasehold interests 
were and continued to remain in full force and effect with no 
notice having been given by either the lessors or lessees relative 
to the termination, and as a matter of fact, no notice of 
termination had issued prior to the Notice dated January 31, 1987, 
which was mailed by counsel for the owners to the tenants. 
The law seems well settled that written lease agreements 
can be extended for an additional term by the conduct of the 
parties after the expiration of the initial term. See: Ochsner v. 
Langendorf, 175 P2d 392, 394 (Colo., 1946), where the Court held: 
"By accepting payment of a month's rent after the 
expiration of the term of the lease, the landlord makes an 
election to treat the party as a tenant from year to year, 
upon the same terms as provided in the original lease." 
Also, in the case of Standard Parts Company v. D & J Investment 
Company, 288 P2d 369, 371 (Okla., 1955), the Court quoted 51 
C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Section 77, Page 628, which states: 
"Where a lease provides that the tenant may at his option 
have an extension for a specified time after the expiration 
of the term of the lease, or may occupy for an extended 
term, including that specified in the lease, the mere 
holdover after the expiration of the specified time is 
generally held to constitute an election to hold for the 
additional or extended term, particularly where coupled 
with the payment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent 
fixed in the option." 
In 50 AM. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, Section 1192, it is 
noted: 
"If the tenant has an option to renew for a specified term, 
the holdover, with payment and unconditional acceptance of 
rent, will create a tenancy for the specified term, such 
acceptance of the rent constituting a waiver of any right 
of the landlord to notice of the intention of the tenant to 
renew." 
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See the many cases cited in support thereof. See: 27 Am, Jur2d.f 
Eminent Domain, Section 250; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bradley, 468 
P2d 95 (Ka.); Wessells v. State Department of Highways, 562 P2d 
1042. 
Written leases frequently contain a "condemnation clause" 
which provides that in the event the subject property is taken by 
the power of eminent domain, the leasehold interest terminates. 
However, such a provision in a lease must be scrutinized to 
determine the true intent of the parties, conditions which must 
occur and what action must be taken before the leasehold interest 
ceases. Where a lease may be cancelled in the event of 
condemnation at the election of the lessor, the issue of notice to 
the tenant becomes of significant import. 
Where an "optional termination clause" exists, the right to 
share in just compensation exists until an "election" is made 
terminating the lease. See: 96 ALR 2d 1140, 1150. The leasehold 
agreements between the owners and tenants contained a specific 
agreement granting the tenants the right and option to renew the 
leasehold agreement. The testimony proffered clearly disclosed 
that the tenants did in fact exercise their respective options to 
renew their leasehold agreement, and thereafter, the owners, by 
their conduct and acguiesence, affirmed and ratified such renewals. 
As noted in 27 Am. Jur2d. 23, Section 250: 
M* * * where it appears that the lessor has given the 
tenant adequate notice of his intention to cancel, the 
lease is deemed terminated and the tenant is precluded from 
sharing in the lessor's condemnation award. The contrary 
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result has been reached, however, where the lessor failed 
to properly notify the lessee of termination. It has been 
held that the right of a tenant to damages for injury to a 
leasehold is not defeated by the fact that under the lease, 
the owner may terminate the tenancy on short notice, if the 
tenant is able to prove a depreciation in the value of the 
leasehold interest." 
See: 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain §12.42 [1][3]. 
The evidence and testimony is unrefuted that the first and 
only election to terminate the subject leasehold interests was by 
letter dated January 31, 1987. (TR. 68-84) (Ex. 8) The trial court 
made no factual determination on the issue of notice. It is 
undisputed that the owners continued to collect the rent on the 
premises from date of condemnation until date of trial, and in all 
respects, dealt with the tenants as though the lease agreements 
were in full force and effect. 
In the case of Garbaldi v. Oklahoma Industrial Finance 
Corp., 543 P2d 555, it has been held that absent an agreement to 
the contrary the rights of a tenant to share in the award became 
vested at the time of the taking. 
The condemnation provision in each lease provides: 
"In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or the 
whole or any part of the said building shall be taken by 
right of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or 
public use or the action of public authorities after the 
execution and before the termination hereof, this Lease 
may, at the election of Lessor or Lessee, be terminated; 
provided, however, in such event, Lessee shall be entitled 
to compensation for improvements made to said premises, in 
an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor in 
respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the 
termination of this Lease." (Emphasis added.) 
Also, in the case of Standard Parts Co. v. D & J Investment 
Co., supra, the Court quoted 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, 
Section 77, Page 628, which states: 
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"Where a lease provides that the tenant may at his option 
have an extension for a specified time after the expiration 
of the term of the lease, or may occupy for an extended 
termf including that specified in the leasef the mere 
holdover after the expiration of the specified time is 
generally held to constitute an election to hold for the 
additional or extended term, particularly where coupled 
with the payment and acceptance, or tender, of the rent 
fixed in the option." 
See also Wells v. Blystad, 14 P2d 1078. 
As heretofore noted, the "condemnation clause" set forth in 
each lease differs from the typical "condemnation clause", which 
generally provides that upon the taking of the entire property by 
eminent domain, the term of the lease shall come to an end. As 
noted in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 506, under such a 
provision, the tenant has no estate or interest in the property 
which remains after the taking which would sustain a claim for 
compensation. However, in the instant case we do not find that 
type of language. To the contrary, the "condemnation clause" in 
each lease makes the termination optional and gives the remedy to 
either the lessor or lessee upon proper notice. In cases of this 
nature a different rule of law seems to apply and in Nichols, 
Eminent Domain, supra, it is stated: 
"It has been held that the law does not look with favor on 
clauses causing forfeiture of the lessee's interest on 
condemnation, hence, a lease covenant will be construed not 
to have that effect if its language and the circumstances 
possibly permit. It has been held also that inquiry may be 
had as to the question of conscionability of the clause." 
See also Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, Inc., 632 P2d 
1334, 1359; and, City and County of Honolulu v. Midkiff, 
616 P2d 213. 
In the case of Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, Inc., 
supra, the Court noted: 
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"A tenant is generally entitled to share in the 
condemnation award made to the landlord to the extent of 
the value of the leaseholdf although such a right may be 
waived by contractual agreement to the contrary." 
The Court further stated: 
"We decline to hold that the first sentence in this clause 
is sufficient as a matter of law to terminate the lessee's 
interest in the remaining term of its leasehold and to 
foreclose participation in the lump sum award. In the 
first place, clauses attempting to terminate leasehold 
interests are construed in favor of the lessee. Nichols, 
Eminent Domain, § 5.23(2) , ( 1979) . Second, the clause, 
unlike that in Highway Com, v. Ore. Investment Co., supra, 
does not specifically exclude the lessee from such 
participation. A prospective lessee, reading this clause, 
might regard it simply as a statement of the legal effect 
of a taking (i.e., that the lease agreement becomes 
inoperative as between the parties). As a matter of 
policy, therefore, we think it preferable to require that, 
if the parties intend that the lessee not share in any 
award made as compensation for the taking, that intent 
should be specifically spelled out. We do not hold, 
however, that the whole clause must necessarily be read to 
mean the opposite, i.e., that the lessee has a right to 
participate in the award. We conclude rather that the 
claus is ambiguous and evidence of the intent of the 
parties must be sought elsewhere." 
Given the nature of the "condemnation clause" here 
involved, we do not believe that the language was of such a clear 
and unambiguous nature as to be void of any material issue of fact. 
It is generally recognized that where a "condemnation clause" in a 
lease of real property possesses a question of fact as to the true 
intent or meaning, the trial court should not dispose of an issue 
on a motion for summary judgment. See City and County of Honolulu 
v. Midkiff, supra; Amjacs Interwest, Inc., v. Design Associates, 
635 P2d 53 (Utah, 1981); and Graham v. Washington Univ., 569 P2d 
896 (Ha., 1977). 
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The tenants, in this instance, in order to protect their 
proprietary interests, were entitled to file an appropriate answer 
to the Complaint in condemnation and assert their claim to 
compensation. At the time the Answer was filed, the initial term 
of the lease had not then expired and whether or not a "bonus 
factor" then existed in the lease remained a factual issue for 
consideration and determination under the circumstances. In this 
case, the trial court, in our judgment and opinion, clearly erred 
in construing the condemnation clause of the respective leases as 
having the effect of being self executing in the termination of the 
leasehold agreements, and the issues raised. 
We do not believe that the language in the lease agreements 
is so clear as to be self-executing or totally dispositive of the 
issue of termination, and does not rise to the level required to 
allow a termination of all claims for loss or damage by the lessee 
as a matter of law. See Urban Renewal Agency v. Weider's, supra. 
A restriction by the trial court to allow the tenants a right to 
address the value of "improvements" only is completely contrary to 
the law of eminent domain. Improvements, if any, could only be 
significant to the extent that they were part of the realty and 
could be considered by the appraisers only for that purpose, if 
any. The method to be applied in apportioning the total award is 
to ascertain the extent of the "bonus value" of each lease, if any, 
and allocate such amount to the lessee and the balance to the 
lessor. See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain §12.42 [3]; Utah State 
Road Commission v. Brown, supra. 
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POINT II 
BASED UPON THE PLEADINGS AND CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED 
HEREIN, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO THE OWNERS AND AGAINST THE TENANTS. 
Both owner and tenant on the issue of attorney's fees are 
defendants in the same case. Plaintiff maintains that it is 
entitled to condemn the subject property and make payment in a 
claimed amount amongst the named defendants. Each of the 
defendants individually responded, claiming an interest in the 
property. No cross-pleading took place between individual 
defendants, but all of the defendants competed for the same pot of 
money. 
It is well settled that a party who deems a contract to be 
void for one purpose, cannot subsequently rely upon that contract 
to support another purpose. BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P2d 456 
(1972). Either a contract is valid and binding as between the 
parties, or does not exist. The ruling of the trial court that the 
contract had ceased to exist, if sustained by this Court, 
terminates the contractual relationships between the parties, 
including the provisions for attorney's fees. 
It is axiomatic that before a claim may be sustained in 
favor of one party against another, it must be founded upon 
pleading and a prayer for relief. Rule 13(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: 
"(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as 
a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein relating to any property that is the 
-18-
subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim 
may include a claim that the party against whom it is 
asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all 
or part of a claim asserted in the action against the 
cross-claimant." 
Tenants timely objected to owner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as not founded upon any proper pleading. This was never 
corrected prior to trial, although language was contained in the 
Findings and Conclusions that purport to conform the pleadings to 
the evidence. URCP Rule 15(b). Said Rule is not applicable in the 
instant case. Tenants did not consent to trial without pleadings. 
The Rule was not designed or contemplated to allow permissive cross 
claims or counterclaims after the fact, and the issue of attorney's 
fees was not new at trial, but raised in owner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and objected to at that time based on improper pleading. 
The trial court ruled at that time no additional pleading was 
necessary. Any attempt to correct this ruling post trial would 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The peripheral claim of the owners was never properly 
plead, and in our opinion, was never properly before the trial 
court in the condemnation action. See: General Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P2d 202 (1976). 
In support of its award for attorney's fees, owners 
submitted an affidavit on behalf of counsel, which made a claim for 
a fee in a range and outlined certain documents that were prepared. 
The affidavit is insufficient on its face for the award of 
attorney's fees in that it does not provide a detailed specific 
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accounting of time spentf provides no justification for the hourly 
rate expended by counsel, provides no support that the amount of 
time expended was consistent and appropriate for the novelty, 
difficulty, and nature of the issues presented. Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P2d 622 (1985); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P2d 100 
(1983); Hal Taylor Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P2d 743 
(1982) . 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the ambiguity in the "condemnation clause" of each 
lease, the continued collection and receipt of rentals, the absence 
of any unconditional Order of Immediate Occupancy, and the failure 
of the owners to give notice of their election to terminate the 
lease agreements until shortly prior to trial present a scenario 
which, in our opinion, precludes the granting of summary judgment 
as a matter of law relative to the rights of the tenants to 
participate in a complete evidentiary hearing on the issues of 
just compensation and compensable interests in the subject 
property. 
The tenants were, in our opinion, entirely justified in 
filing an appropriate answer to the Complaint served upon them and 
were further entitled to develop and present to the jury the 
necessary evidence and testimony to support their claims and 
contentions that each leasehold interest had a "bonus value" and 
upon an appropriate finding to that effect would have been entitled 
to share or otherwise participate in the award for damages rendered 
in this cause. The ruling of the trial court that the mere filing 
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of the action served to dispose of or otherwise terminate the 
leasehold interests as a matter of law is not consistent with the 
prevailing law, or otherwise supported by the evidence proffered. 
Based upon the authorities and facts set forth hereinabove, 
we do not believe there exists any reasonable or other basis upon 
which the trial court should have awarded attorney's fees against 
the tenants simply because they sought to partipate in the judicial 
process of having a jury make a determination relative to the 
extent of their interests in said properties and the amount of 
compensation, if any, to which they were entitled. Clearly such a 
ruling constituted reversible error. 
Based upon the authorities cited hereinabove, we 
respectfully urge that the ruling and judgment of the trial court 
be reversed, that the cause be remanded for appropriate proceedings 
on the issue of damages, and that these Appellants be awarded their 
costs, attorney's fees, and such further and additional relief as 
this Court may deem appropriate and just in the premises. 
DATED this day of January, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
BRANT H. WALL 
JEROME H. MOONEY, III 
BY 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
L E A S E 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE made and entered into as 
of the 1st day of August 19 81 by and 
between BEATRICE BARROTS, ROBERT G. BARROWS, AND JUNE BURGE, all 
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
'LESSOR,1' and Terry Pantelakis dba 
AAA Jewelry 6c Loans
 f hereinafter referred to as 
'LESSEE;" 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That in consideration of the rental, covenants and 
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the 
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby 
lease, demise and le t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire 
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as: 
64 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of 
Five (5) years beginning the 1st day of August 
19 81 . 
Lessee shall pay Lessor the sum of $ 4,800.00 
payable at the rate of $ 400.00 per month, monthly in 
advance, on the 1st day of each and every month for a 
period of Sixty (60) months, commencing August 1 , 
19 81 . 
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Notices, payments and other carrmnications herein 
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered 
when mailed by either registered or ordinary first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and to Lessee at 66 East and Second South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 
Ihis Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said 
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used 
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office 
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or 
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such 
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned, 
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written 
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this 
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so deter-
mine and elect. Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of 
said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly 
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part 
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent 
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure 
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action 
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be 
deemed a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing 
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues. 
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind 
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk 
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee. Lessor 
shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary 
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage 
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to person or property in or about said premises or such building 
resulting from electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or 
gas, unless caused by or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents, 
servants or employees. Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages 
to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by 
Lessor that such defects or damages exist. 
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal 
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use 
of said premises. 
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent 
(40%) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable 
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof, 
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon 
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that 
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor 
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused, 
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial rest-
oration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-one (91) days 
following the date the damage occurred. If this Lease is not so 
terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to 
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved 
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to 
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall 
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation. No 
compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason 
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing 
any portion of said premises or the said building however such 
necessity may occur. 
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In the event said premises,"or any part thereof, or 
the vhole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right 
of eminent domain or shall be "taken for any street or public use 
or the action of p\:blic authorities after the execution and before 
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor 
or Lessee, be terminated; -provided, however, in such event, Lessee 
shalUrbe-entitled to compensation for iapruvements made to said 
premises7 -in~an> amount equal -to the compensation received by Lessor 
in respect-thereof and as a* result thereof, regardless of the term-
ination of this Lease. 
Ihtry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee 
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and 
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satis-
factory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition 
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be 
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure 
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents, 
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said 
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable 
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or 
iuprovements of or additions to said premises without the prior 
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions 
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of 
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding 
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said 
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of 
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises 
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease. 
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It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall default in 
making any or all rental payments, keeping any or all terms, con-
ditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become 
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then 
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written 
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon 
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this 
Lease as to all future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees that in 
case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this 
paragraph, Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss of rents 
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would 
have been entitled to receive under the terms and provisions of 
this Lease, and also against all attorney's fees and expenses in-
curred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of 
this Lease. 
No-holding-over by Lessee,- however- long--continued, 
shall operate to renew**or extend~this Lease without Lessor's 
written,<consent. If Lessee tolds possession of said premises 
after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee 
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the last installment during the last month of the term of this 
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to 
be such tenant until the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor 
or until Lessee shall have given Lessor a written notice of at 
least one (1) xnsnth of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy. 
Lessor shall furnish such heating as may be required 
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition 
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Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and 
Lessee shall also pay all plumbing bills and electric ligjit 
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the terms and pro-
visions of this Lease. 
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate 
window glass upon said premises. In the event of any breakage, 
Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of 
same. 
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any 
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property 
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against 
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/?300,000, a copy 
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution 
of this Lease Agreement. 
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional 
yearly rent, in and above the real property taxes assessed on 
said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year ^ 8 1 
Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year 
^-
986
 , and thereafter during the term of this Lease. 
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and 
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs, 
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties 
hereto. 
In the event, however, that, at any time during the 
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide 
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable 
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and 
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter 
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in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the 
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms. If 
Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute 
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall 
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making 
the offer on the same terms .and condiditons set forth in such 
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all 
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate. 
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit 
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the 
dissolution of Lessor*s interests as herein stated, for nominal 
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no rigjit to purchase 
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance. 
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part 
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time 
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, material-
mens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with 
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances 
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of 
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which 
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or 
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the 
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and 
at all times proqptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all 
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to 
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and 
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or 
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto. Lessee shall give 
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Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance 
of the commencement of any construction, alterations, addition, 
improvement or repair estimated to cost in eyuaess of $ 1,000.00 
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's 
non-responsibility. 
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall 
notify Lessor of its intention to do so witidn five (5) days 
after the filing of such lien. In such case, and provided that 
Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient 
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or 
damage arising out of such, contest, Lessee shall not be in de-
fault hereunder until ten (10) days after the final extermination 
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy 
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the 
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any 
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered 
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder. 
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and in-
demnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting 
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this 
Lease for- a period of - Five (5) years" after^the* expiration of 
the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least 
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all 
other terms and conditionf; of the renewal lease to be the same as 
those herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor 
written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days 
before this lease expires. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth. 
LESSEE: LESSOR: 
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS 
>r J2.. .
 r tuX^ t * £> 6 t **t\rjc fru± 
(Including Title) 
t * (a t < <-v 
L E A S E 
THIS HCOTTURE OF LEASE made and entered Into as 
of the 1st day of August , 19 31 by and 
between BEATRICE BAKRCWS, ROBERT G. BARRCWS, AND JUNE 3UKZ, a l l 
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
"LESSOR," and Ellen K. Daskalas dba 
The Pawn Shop
 f hereinafter referred to as 
"LESSEE," 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That in consideration of the rental, covenants and 
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the 
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby 
lease, demise and let unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire 
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as: 
66 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of 
Five (5) years beginning the 1st day of August 
19 81 . 
Lessee shall pay Lessor the sum of $ 5,400.00 
payable at the rate of $ 450.00 per month, monthly in 
advance, on the 1st day of each and every month for a 
period of Sixty (60) months, commencing August 1 , 
19 81 . 
- 2 -
Notices, payments and other corrmjnications herein 
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered 
when mailed by either registered or ordinary first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and to Lessee at 66 East and Second South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 . 
Ibis lease shall not be assigned, and neither said 
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used 
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office 
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or 
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such 
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned, 
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written 
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this 
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so deter-
mine and elect. Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of 
said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly 
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part 
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent 
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure 
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action 
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be 
deemed a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing 
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues. 
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind 
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk 
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee. Lessor 
shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary 
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage 
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to person or property in or about said premises or such building 
resulting frcm electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or 
gas, unless caused by or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents, 
servants or employees. Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages 
to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by 
Lessor that such defects or damages exist. 
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal 
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use 
of said premises. 
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent 
(40%) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable 
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof, 
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon 
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that 
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor 
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused, 
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial rest-
oration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-cne (91) days 
following the date the damage occurred. If this Lease is not so 
terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to 
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved 
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to 
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall 
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation. No 
compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason 
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing 
any portion of said premises or the said building however such 
necessity may occur. 
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In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or 
the whole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right 
of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or public use 
or the action of public authorities after the execution and before 
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor 
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee 
shall be entitled to compensation for improvements made to said 
premises, in an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor 
in respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the term-
ination of this Lease. 
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee 
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and 
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satis-
factory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition 
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be 
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure 
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents, 
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said 
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable 
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or 
improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior 
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions 
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of 
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding 
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said 
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of 
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises 
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease. 
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It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall default in 
making any or all rental payments, keeping any or all terms, con-
ditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become 
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then 
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written 
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon 
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this 
Lease as to all future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees that in 
case of teimination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this 
paragraph, Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss of rents 
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would 
have been entitled to receive under the terms and provisions of 
this Lease, and also against all attorney's fees and expenses in-
curred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of 
this Lease. 
No holding over by Lessee, however long continued, 
shall operate to renew or extend this Lease without Lessor's 
written consent. If Lessee holds possession of said premises 
after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee 
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the last installment during the last month of the term of this 
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to 
be such tenant until the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor 
or until Lessee shall have given Lessor a written notice of at 
least one (1) month of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy. 
Lessor shall furnish such heating as may be required 
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition 
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Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and 
Lessee shall also pay all plurbing bills and electric ligfrt 
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the terms and pro-
visions of this Lease. 
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate 
window glass upon said premises. In the event of any breakage, 
Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of 
same. 
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any 
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property 
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against 
said liability in a sum of not less than $100, (XXV $300,000, a copy 
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution 
of this Lease Agreement. 
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional 
yearly rent, in and above the real property taxes assessed on 
said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year ^ 8 1 
Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year 
^ ° " , and thereafter during the term of this Lease. 
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and 
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs, 
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties 
hereto. 
In the event, however, that, at any time during the 
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide 
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable 
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and 
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter 
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in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the 
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms. If 
Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute 
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall 
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making 
the offer on the same terms and condiditons set forth in such 
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all 
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate. 
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit 
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the 
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal 
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no right to purchase 
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance. 
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part 
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time 
located therecn free and clear of any and all mechanics, material-
mens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with 
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances 
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of 
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which 
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or 
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the 
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and 
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all 
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to 
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and 
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or 
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto. Lessee shall give 
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Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance 
of the comnencement of any construction, alterations, addition, 
iirprovement or repair estimated to cost in excess of $ 1,000.00 
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's 
non-responsibility. 
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall 
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5) days 
after the filing of such lien. In such case, and provided that 
Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient 
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or 
damage arising out of such contest, Lessee shall not be in de-
fault hereunder until ten (10) days after the final determination 
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy 
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the 
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any 
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered 
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder. 
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and in-
demnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting 
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this 
Lease for a period of Five (5) years after the expiration of 
the- term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least 
sixty (60) days prior to the expiraticn of this Lease, with all 
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the same as 
those herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor 
written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days 
before this lease expires. 
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IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth. 
LESSEE: LESSOR: 
THE PAWN SHOP 
S 
/* 
By >^V>. ., „ JL<£^*<J*<^ 
(Including Title) 
ATTEST: 
y^u u, frJ~L^ • 
(Including Title) ^ ,, - j - n - J i -
n 
j-
C<. ^ /^ - ^ -~ < 
